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Abstract: What happens to a memory when it has been externalised and embodied 
but has not reached its addressee yet? A letter that has been written but has not been 
read, a monument before it is unveiled or a Neolithic tool buried in the ground – all 
these objects harbour human memories engrained in their physicality; messages 
intended for those who will read the letter, admire the monument and hold the tool.  
According to Ilyenkov’s theory of objective idealism, the conscious and wilful input 
encoded in all manmade objects as the ‘ideal’ has an objective existence, 
independent from the author, but this existence lasts only while memories are shared 
between communicating parties. If all human minds were absent from the world for 
a period of time, the ‘ideal’, or memories, would cease to exist. They would spring 
back to existence, however, once humans re-entered the world. Ilyenkov’s analysis 
of memories existing outside an individual human consciousness is informative and 
thorough but, following his line of thought, we would have to accept an ontological 
gap in the process of memory acquisition, storage and transmission. If there is a 
period, following memory acquisition and preceding its transmission, when 
memories plainly do not exist, then each time a new reader, spectator or user 
perceives them, he or she must create the author’s memories ex nihilo. Bergson’s 
theory of duration and intuition can help us to resolve this paradox. 
This paper will explore the ontological characteristics of memory passage in 
communication taken at different stages of the process. There will be an indication 
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of how the findings of this investigation could be applicable to concrete cases of 
memory transmission. In particular, this concerns intergenerational communication, 
technological memory, the use of digital devices and the Internet. 
 
Keywords: Ilyenkov, memory transition, image, digital devices, intergenerational 
communication  
 
*** 
Transition de la mémoire entre les agents communicants 
 
Résumé : Qu'arrive-t-il à la mémoire lorsqu’elle a été extériorisée et incarnée sans 
encore toucher son destinataire ? Une lettre qui a été écrite mais pas encore lue, un 
monument avant qu'il ne soit dévoilé ou un outil du Néolithique enfoui dans le sol – 
tous ces objets contiennent des « mémoires humaines » incrustées dans leur 
physicalité ; des messages destinés à ceux qui liront la lettre, admireront le 
monument et tiendront l'outil… 
A partir de ce questionnement et en s’appuyant sur la théorie d'Ilyenkov sur 
l'idéalisme objectif, l’article s’intéressera aux caractéristiques ontologiques du 
passage de la mémoire à la communication  à différents moments du processus. Le 
but consiste à montrer comment s’applique-t-elle la transmission de la mémoire à 
des situations concrètes de communication, en particulier à la communication 
intergénérationnelle, à la mémoire technologique, à l'usage des dispositifs 
numériques et de l’Internet. 
 
Mots-clés : Ilyenkov, transition de la mémoire, image, dispositifs numériques, 
communication intergénérationnelle  
 
*** 
 
 
Whether or not we consider Shannon and Weaver’s model to be an 
oversimplification of the complexity of human communication (Shannon and 
Weaver, 1949),* it could be argued that the transmission of information is something 
                                                            
* Shannon and Weaver’s model presents communication as a process of “transmitting information”.  
According to them, communication involves 6 elements: (1) an information source which produces a 
message; (2) a transmitter which encodes the message into signals; (3) a channel, to which signals are 
adapted for transmission; (4) a receiver which decodes the message from the signal; (5) a destination, 
where the message arrives; (6) noise which may distort the message. This model was supposed to aid 
telephone and radio communication but, instead of being restricted to a mathematical theory of 
communication it was  “widely accepted as one of the main seeds out of which Communication Studies 
has grown” (Fiske, 1982: 6) and gave rise to a transmissive model of communication.  
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that every instance of communication necessarily entails. Ideas and instructions, 
opinions and historical accounts, even emotional outbursts contain information 
which is delivered to the recipient in the course of a communicative act. 
 
The process of passing information from the giver to the receiver involves a 
future directed vector, where information, prior to being communicated to the 
recipient, is first accumulated and retained by the giver. Thus all those items of 
information passing from mind to mind contain memories, and the transmission of 
information in its turn necessarily involves the transmission of memories. Focusing 
on the process of memory transition between communicating agents, I will examine 
the changing ontological features of memories as they are acquired, stored and 
communicated.  
 
1. Acquisition of memories 
 
Bergson’s analyses of image perception (Bergson, 1991) and memory formation 
where he discusses the memory of the present (Bergson, 1975, p. 134 – 185) can be 
helpful whilst we consider the stage of memory accumulation that precedes memory 
transition to the recipient. 
 
Material objects, Bergson observes, do not merely exist in themselves, 
undetectable and imperceptible. They can be heard, felt, seen and smelt. Bergson 
finds this a decisive feature of physical bodies and defines matter as “an aggregate 
of images.” (Bergson, 1991, p. 9) He uses the term “image” in order to capture that 
element which connects the percipient subject and the thing perceived – image is 
something which is shared by both: the thing emanates it, and the subject receives it 
in perception. As Bergson says, by “image” we mean a certain existence which is 
more than that which the idealist calls a representation, but less than that which the 
realist calls a thing – an existence placed halfway between the “thing and the 
“representation” … [T]he object exists in itself, and, on the other hand, the object is, 
in itself, pictorial, as we perceive it: image it is, but a self-existing image. (Bergson, 
1991, p. 9 - 10)   
 
Placing an image between a representation and a thing, Bergson proposes a term 
which is supposed to reflect a transition from the object to the subject and a 
correlation between them. Whereas representation belongs exclusively to the subject 
as a private mental process, and a thing is a fragment of physical reality with no 
reference to the subject, an image is a feature that relates to both: the perceivable 
object is an image for the subject, and the subject accesses and appropriates this 
image. The difference between the Bergsonian image and a mere imprint is that 
whilst an imprint is what the object makes and leaves behind, an image is what the 
object emanates and gives to the subject, but also retains.  
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An image belongs to the mind because it is what we find in ourselves when we 
see, hear or touch: pictures, sounds and sensations. But it also belongs to the object 
inasmuch as the latter appears on the superficial level as a picture, sound and touch. 
If our perception is to be compared with a photograph of things, then we must 
realise that this photograph “is already taken, already developed in the very heart of 
things.” (Bergson, 1991, p. 38)* 
 
Extending thus the idea of visual imagery to imagery in a wider sense and 
accounting for the dynamism of reality, one can extend the Bergsonian account of 
image perception as perception of things to the perception of events. Just as image 
and image perception provide a point of fusion between the perceiving subject and 
the perceived object, the same could be said about events which we perceive. It may 
be possible to ascertain then that event perception is fused with the event itself via 
the imagery of the event and the imagery perception, so that both constitute phases 
of one and the same process. This could account for at least one aspect of memory 
acquisition concerning sensory data (which in its turn fuses with our formerly 
acquired memories of similar events and related concepts so that we can intelligently 
interpret what we have seen and heard). 
 
Bergson derives memory formation from perception claiming that it is an illusion 
to believe “that memory succeeds perception.” (Bergson, 1975, p. 160) He states: 
“[T]he formation of memory is never posterior to the formation of perception; it is 
contemporaneous with it.” (Bergson, 1975, p. 157) Memory, he asserts, is formed 
alongside perception (Bergson, 1975, p. 159 – 160), and after perception has ceased, 
memory remains. (Bergson, 1975, p. 164). In other words, memory which, in the 
Bergsonian terms, belongs to the domain of the past is nevertheless formed in the 
present whilst the perception of images is taking place.  
 
The ontological duality of reality as something that exists objectively and 
something that can be perceived as an aggregate of images in itself entails the 
predisposition towards the split of the epistemological process into perception and 
memory.  
 
Every moment of our life presents two aspects, it is actual and virtual, perception 
on the one side and memory on the other. Each moment of life is split up as and 
                                                            
* A more detailed exposition and interpretation of images in Bergson, close to this position, can be found 
in Moore, 1996, p. 23 – 32. For a clearer understanding of the issue, it may be useful to compare and 
contrast Bergson’s theory with alternative accounts of images and imagination. Whereas for Bergson, 
imagery is the result of the filtering of reality, Crowther’s analysis, for example, emphasizes the creative 
aspect of imagination and the ability of images to be detached from the immediacy of their origin. 
(Crowther, 2003, p. 66 – 77, especially p. 73 – 75). Husserl opposes imagination and perception (Husserl, 
1964, p. 54), and Smart refuses to believe that images exist at all (Smart, 1997, p. 20). For an explanation 
of various usages of the term “imagination” see Ryle, 1969, p. 245 – 79. 
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when it is posited. (Bergson, 1975, p. 165) This can help us understand how we 
form our memories whilst being engrossed in the reality of events: 
 
The memory will be seen to duplicate the perception at every moment, to arise 
with it, to be developed at the same time, and to survive it precisely because it is of a 
quite different nature. (Bergson, 1975, p. 164) The difference between memory and 
perception is explained further in the following terms: The memory seems to be to 
the perception what the image reflected in the mirror is to the object in front of it. 
The object can be touched as well as seen; acts on us as well as we on it; is pregnant 
with possible actions; it is actual. The image is virtual, and though it resembles the 
object, it is incapable of doing what the object does. (Bergson, 1975, p. 165) 
 
Both actual and virtual, reality is double-edged. The actual here is its material 
component that physically interacts with the perceiver inasmuch as he or she is a 
physical body himself or herself. The virtual component is its image which, 
immaterial and inactive, can be perceived by one’s mind in perception i.e. 
simultaneously with the image being emanated from the object. Once lodged in our 
memory, the image disengages from the time when it was perceived and secures its 
existence outside the object as a memorised image. The entirety of our present 
appears to us as both perception and memory (Bergson, 1975, p. 166) but when the 
present existence of an event and our actual, acting involvement expire and become 
past, perception expires too but memory remains. 
 
If the retained memory is intended to be passed on to others, it needs to be 
extracted from one’s own mind and presented in a way which would make it 
accessible for other minds. The stage which follows the acquisition of a memory but 
precedes its transmission to the recipient is the most enigmatic. Words that have 
been written but not read yet, pictures created but not yet seen, ideas expressed but 
not yet acknowledged – what is the nature of these phenomena? Do they exist? Do 
they exist as objective reality? If they exist objectively, then what is the nature of 
their objectivity? 
 
2. Storage of memories 
 
By ‘storage of memories’ I mean the stage when memory, released from 
someone’s mind, becomes embodied and externalized in some way, nevertheless 
remaining in the state of suspension prior to being acknowledged and processed by 
another mind. 
 
They are no longer an integral part of their author’s psychosocial makeup, not 
part of his or her inner person. They are estranged and alienated from the person 
who released them with all conceivable consequences. In particular, this is evident 
from research on technological remembering where the unfailing digital memory of 
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the Internet puts people at constant risk of being subjected to cyberbulling if they 
had ever posted painful or harmful material of some sort. (Eede, 2010, p. 171) 
 
Further venturing into the nature of memories in suspension can be largely 
helped by Ilyenkov’s exploration of the objectivity of the ideal. His concept of the 
objectively existing “ideal” refers precisely to memories which, having become 
embodied in physical objects, left the domain of one individual brain and became 
available for others. (Ilyenkov, 2009) Working within the framework of the Soviet 
philosophy, heavily impregnated with socio-political concerns, he examines such 
memories as products of labour. However, if his discourse is liberated from the 
constraints of the Moscovite dialectical materialism, it can be instantly extended to 
human activity in general inasmuch as the latter generates tangible objects loaded 
with memories that are passed on to other people who encounter and use these 
objects. 
 
Ilyenkov sees the creation of the “ideal” in all conscious activity (to which he 
refers as labour). When a theorist writes a book using a pen and paper or a 
typewriter, he or she produces an ideal product even though his or her work is 
presented as a tangible collection of perceivable marks on paper. The writer is 
engaged in spiritual, not material labour, Ilyenkov says. When a painter paints a 
picture he or she creates an ideal image, and when a designer makes a drawing, he or 
she does not produce a material object yet but creates an ideal machine. (Ilyenkov, 
2009, p. 23 - 24)  
 
Moving Ilyenkov’s discussion away from the preoccupation with different types 
of labour (physical v intellectual), and replacing the notion of productive labour with 
that of human activity per se, which inevitably generates tangible objects anyway, 
we arrive at a depiction of the world where human spirit and human memory are 
invested and remain present in everything that is handmade or manufactured, from a 
Paleolithic axe to the Asus Padfone. Every manmade object is permeated by ideas 
and memories, and every such object contains a message, received and 
acknowledged when we recognize manmade objects and use them as tools. 
 
Ilyenkov specifically notes that the ‘ideal’ does not become objectified 
exclusively in a verbalised form. As well as being objectified verbally, it can be 
objectified graphically, in a sculpture, or in a ritualistic activity in which we 
manipulate objects and interact with people in a particular way. When the ideal (or 
memory) is objectified non-verbally, the communication of it is more effective 
because nonverbal, ocular objectification can be received directly by another mind 
rather than mediated by verbal conceptualisation. Drawings and models, symbolic 
artefacts such as coats of arms, banners and uniforms, household objects and toys, 
coins and banknotes – all these and similar objects harbour within themselves the 
ideal imagery which effects communication between human beings. 
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Referring to the specific ontology of the ideal, or memories, Ilyenkov describes 
the ideal as images of human culture which are embodied in a material form. For 
him such imagery is an aggregate of historically established means of societal 
activity and communication. As far as he is concerned, it is a special form of 
objective reality opposing itself to an individual as an object comparable to material 
reality. The ideal is found in the same location as material reality, and for this reason 
it is often confused with material reality. (Ilyenkov, 2009, p. 31) A story can be 
confused with the book that contains it, and the photographic image of a person can 
be confused with the photographic paper on which it is printed. 
 
Ilyenkov asserts that the “ideal” is a relation between two qualitative terms, one 
of which represents the essence of another in the emanations of human activity. The 
representation of a thing’s essence can be adequate and pure if another thing’s 
matter is used as the material for its representation. One thing lodges its essence, 
ideally conceived, into another thing and the latter becomes the symbol of the 
former. A diplomat, for example, symbolically represents his or her country, money 
represents the value of all goods and words represent the meaning of phenomena. 
The “ideal” is a representation in “other” and via “other” and this is a representation 
of the very essence of things rather than of their external features. 
 
This representation takes place only in human activity. Contrary to the strict 
materialistic view which accepts the “ideal” only as imagery that is located inside 
the brain, Ilyenkov argues that the ideal can be located anywhere and any manmade 
object can be the body of an idea. (Maidansky, 2004; 2005) Translating the latter 
assertion into the terms of memory discourse, a recollection can be lodged 
anywhere, in any artefact or a process driven by conscious activity – a book, a tool, 
or a dance. 
 
When a fragment of the natural world is invested with a human being’s 
conscious and wilful input we have an embodied memory, a memory embedded in 
that fragment of modified matter. This memory will be communicated to those who 
will encounter the object, to those who will recognise it as a manmade tool or 
appliance and knowingly use it as intended by its maker. 
 
But what happens to these memories when the tool was made but has not been 
used? The work of art created but admired by no one? A book written but nor read 
yet? When a book is written memories are lodged inside it, and the book becomes 
their carrier and representative. When the book is read, memories are retrieved by 
the reader, but what exactly happens to the memories in the period that follows their 
externalisation as written words but precedes their being read by the reader? 
 
Ilyenkov has an answer to that – an inevitably materialistic one. The ideal, or 
memories, which are encoded in manmade objects, exist only as inter-subjective 
reality. They exist for as along as human minds exist. Ilyenkov recalls Dubrovsky’s 
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thought experiment according to which, if someone would suddenly put all people 
into a deep sleep for ten minutes, there would be nothing ideal existing on our planet 
during that time. (Ilyenkov, 2009, p. 23) For us it should mean that no memories 
would then exist. The existence of the ideal, thus understood, resembles an 
electromagnetic field: it is there when its source is activated (say, when a microwave 
oven is switched on), and not there – or anywhere – when the source is inactive or 
absent. 
 
The following difficulties arise here. If the objective existence of memories, or 
the ideal, depends on them being acknowledged, then the mere existence of human 
consciousness is not sufficient to maintain the existence of memories. The ideal 
must be thought of in order to exist, not just be surrounded by living minds that are 
unaware of its existence. If memories, which someone’s mind has enthused and 
embedded in an outside object, are objective only when someone else is able to 
recognise these embedded memories, then in order to guarantee the persistent 
existence of memories, or the ideal, at least one mind needs to be conscious of that 
ideal. How else could its content exist and be kept alive, the content that draws on 
human consciousness and will and requires a conscious and wilful input for its 
recognition? If a book merely stands on the shelf and no one is writing or reading it 
at the moment, the story that constitutes its ideal essence is nonexistent during that 
time. Books, after being written, normally alternate between being read and not 
being read, and so do the memories inside them. Those memories that were written 
down by their authors with the intention to communicate them to readers thus 
persistently alternate between being and not being. They enter the ‘being’ mode 
when they are being read or thought about, and then switch to a ‘non-being’ mode 
when they are not being read or thought about, and this goes on indefinitely. 
 
If we agree with the view that the ideal disappears completely if it is not being 
acknowledged, then we must admit that each time a reader opens the book, he or she 
creates the ideal ex nihilo, and it is puzzling how the essentially same ideal – the 
story - can be created again and again by different readers if this creation happens 
anew each time. We cannot therefore agree that memories simply do not exist during 
the stage that follows their externalisation but precedes their transition to other 
minds. Stories, designs, the meanings of things must exist in some dormant, 
simmering form; they must partake of some level of objectivity that is not 
maintained by the presence of minds. Their ontology as objective reality requires a 
special investigation. 
 
Memory transition must entail continuity of its own existence as process, for if 
we accept the materialist claim that unacknowledged memories do not exist 
objectively, then the idea of memory transition becomes problematic because it 
cannot sufficiently account for those stages when memories are stored in manmade 
objects as the ideal. There must be something that ensures the continuity of memory 
existence during the period when it has been released but not yet received. 
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The concept of continuity is crucial here, and needs to be investigated in relation 
to the process of memory acquisition, storage and transmission. This brings us to 
Bergson’s concept of duration as a process understood in a special way. For 
Bergson, the term duration reflects the inner temporality of a naturally occurring 
process as against the imposed temporality of external markers fixed by calendars 
and clocks. Conscious processes are a special case of duration, although the term 
can be applicable to any temporal eventuality that develops and evolves from within. 
The inner temporality of a self-evolving process is characterised by its unique 
rhythms, its own pace, its own speed and by the fact that its progress takes as long as 
it takes, and the time of this process cannot be speeded up or contracted. Dissolving 
sugar in a glass of water is an example of a process being ring-fenced against 
outside temporal tampering: we must wait until sugar is dissolved and our 
impatience is inconsequential. (Bergson, 1964, p. 10) 
 
The genuine nature of duration is accessible only from within the process itself, 
whilst an outside observer perceives it as a modified phenomenon. Unable to grasp 
the infinite complexity, specific dynamics and uniqueness of duration, the observer 
perceives it as a simplified, impoverished and even immobilized object. For 
example, according to Bergson, the content of an individual human consciousness 
cannot be grasped by anyone rather than the person himself or herself. (Bergson, 
1910, p. 184 – 189) Indeed, a feeling of frustration when attempts to share the 
uniqueness of one’s experiences with others fail is not an uncommon feature of 
human communication. 
 
However, a thorough investigation into the notion of duration reveals a more 
optimistic picture: genuine, fulfilling communication between people is possible but 
it does not amount to the grasping of the essence of each other’s soul. Instead it is 
the grasping of the essence of another process, the duration of a communicative act, 
in which communicating parties are involved. In connection with this theme which I 
explored previously (Fell, 2009), I would add that pursuing a joined aim or working 
together on a project is a process that has its own existence and develops as duration. 
Those who are involved in it access this duration from within and share the grasp of 
it with fellow collaborators. Accessing a process jointly through work, family life or 
religious practices gives the satisfaction of mutual understanding that people seek in 
communication but fail to reach if they simply stand face to face with one another. 
By being involved in the communicative practice we fuse ontology and 
epistemology where our perceptions, information exchanges and memories become 
part of our being. Through this epistemological communicative channeling our 
being fuses with other people’s being, and the fusion is stronger when we are 
involved in vitally important projects. Parents caring for a child, inmates digging a 
tunnel to escape form prison, fellow combatants passing through a hostile territory - 
situations like these, marked by intensified joint responsibility, danger, or hope 
create a sense of comradeship that is necessary for the success of the project and 
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which incidentally grants the participants that intense happiness associated with 
mutual appreciation, understanding and recognition, even though this happiness may 
not be overtly noticeable against the backdrop of a stressful and traumatic situation. 
 
Communicative fulfillment can be achieved when one forgets about oneself as an 
individual with private aims and joins others in selfless caring about something else. 
This something else can involve caring for one’s own interests as well but as a 
process that involves other people’s input and interests it gains an existence of its 
own, not equal to the existence of one person’s concerns. An important point here is 
that the immunity of duration to outside penetration applies to this kind of duration 
as well, so that belonging that is shared between group members involved in their 
special actions and practices (work colleagues, club members, public school boys, 
soldiers, prison inmates, etc) excludes outsiders who are not able to casually engage 
with these processes. 
 
The same sort of engagement takes place in memory transmission as well. When 
a memory is released and externalized by one agent (say, a book has been written) 
and then perceived by another agent (the book has been read), a communicative 
process is formed, in which both parties are now engaged. The recipient of the 
author’s memories (the reader) achieves the contentment of understanding someone 
else’s thoughts. This process of author-reader engagement is also a case of duration 
which can only be accessed form within by those who have been initiated into the 
externally expressed memory, i.e. those who actually read the book (as against the 
critics who have not read the book but discuss it nonetheless). 
 
As I noted at the beginning of this paper, transmitting a memory is a necessary 
strand of the communicative process, and as such is a constituent element of 
communicative duration. Bearing in mind that duration harbours its own inner 
temporality, the following observation can be made. The area where we observe a 
gap in the existence of memories, or their activation (e.g. the book been written but 
not yet read) is found in the sphere other than memory and then is applied to 
memory. To explain, we observe events and phenomena which are associated with 
transmitted memories but are not memories themselves. As Ilyenkov pointed out, we 
confuse the memory with the material in which it is encoded. We observe the book 
being on the shelf after it was written but before it is read and say that memories 
contained therein do not exist during that period as if the existence of a memory is 
ontologically bound with someone physically handling the book. If we observe the 
gap in the handling of the book we do so without examining memory itself. But if 
we accept that in the complex eventuality of memory transmission, memory per se 
has its own existence as duration which is not identical to the existence of its 
material carrier and other coordinated processes, then we will accept that memory as 
duration has its own distinct temporality, which may appear as a discrete interrupted 
process (if we associate it with its material carrier) but which within itself maintains 
its own continuity. 
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It is possible to see the process of memory transition as an uninterrupted process 
if one considers this process from within itself. The author writing a story and the 
reader reading it are parts of an uninterrupted process regardless of the period during 
which the book stands on the shelf, ignored by everyone. When the author writes his 
or her last words, when the book is finished and published, this phase of its duration 
fuses with the moment in which the reader opens it and reads the first lines. This 
happens no matter how long it takes for the book to be discovered by the reader. It 
could be said that this fusion happens immediately when the reader opens the book, 
but there is more than that: this immediate fusion retrospectively mends the 
ontological gap of memory non-existence. The possibility of a retrospective fusion is 
entailed in the concept of duration inasmuch as it is a heterogeneous whole with all 
elements being entwined and interconnected, and this should include asynchronous 
processes contained therein. 
 
The duration of memory transition is not interrupted: the words and ideas that 
preoccupied the author are directly passed on to the reader. The author’s creating the 
story and the reader’s reading it are phases of one continuous process of memory 
development, retention and transition. The gap between these two phases, observed 
in the external reality does not belong to the duration of memory development and 
transition. Its inner temporality is structured as a continuous flow of memory 
passage that follows memory creation and externalization. The moment when the 
author writes the last word remains the closing moment of this duration until the 
reader opens the book and starts reading. The passage of time of the clock while the 
book was not read remains outside this duration, which has its own time. The 
moment when the reader discovers the book and starts reading fuses with the 
process of the author’s writing. The eventuality of writing fuses with the eventuality 
of reading and together they restore and maintain their own special time of story 
creation and memory passage. This process is uninterrupted in its existence and is 
continuous. Even though in the time of external things an ontological gap can be 
observed, memory itself does not suffer from intermittency. The reader’s receiving 
the memory has bridged that gap and restored retrospectively the continuity of 
memory existence. 
 
The process of memory creation and passage is uninterrupted and continuous, 
considered from within; seen from the outside, it is interrupted. How does this 
outside gap translate into the terms of the duration of memory transition itself? 
When the author finishes the writing process and (theoretically) forgets about what 
he or she has written, the story, it may be said, does not unroll by itself and is not 
there. But its ‘not there’ is not the same as the complete non-existence of, say, a 
story that had never been written, planned or thought of in any way by anyone. The 
story that was written had been unrolling and had been objectified in a particular 
way. On the one hand, its objectivity depends on someone’s brain activity, on the 
other hand the story has been projected outwards from within the brain and is now 
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lodged in an external material object. When the creator’s brain no longer thinks 
about it (say, in the event of the author’s demise) it remains lodged in the material 
object and so its objective existence continues. The difference is that it is not 
acknowledged by anyone at that time. It is ontologically deficient: it exists but needs 
to be acknowledged in order to manifest itself; its existence alone is not sufficient 
for it to manifest itself. 
 
Memory, the ideal, must satisfy two conditions in order to be accepted as 
existing objectively: it must be lodged in matter and it must be acknowledged by a 
human mind. When it is not acknowledged it nevertheless remains lodged in the 
material object. Although no one is reading the words, the words are still in the 
book; no one has erased them. The fact of memories being lodged and continuously 
remaining lodged in the material base ensures the continuity of memory passage 
from one mind to another. 
 
So in the gap between memory externalization and memory perception there is 
still the lodgment of memory. Memory occupies no space, and yet it is lodged in a 
spatial object which can be physically moved from one place to another, taking 
memories with it. In the absence of an inquisitive mind memory encoded in matter is 
inactive and undetectable. Yet it is not nonexistent, for as soon as someone gives it 
his or her attention, the memory springs to existence in a full sense, as objective 
reality existing outside people’s minds, in the network that is instantly created or 
restored between the mind that created the memory, and the mind or minds who 
received it. When memory transition takes place the external temporal gap closes as 
the receiving mind takes over from the point where the giving mind had left it. No 
matter how great is the temporal distance between the instances of memory being 
activated, the fissure is sealed from within the duration of memory creation and 
passage. The continuity of this duration is not affected. 
 
Imagine an axe made by a Neolithic man. Its maker held it and used it for some 
time, then lost it, and the memory of the tool expired at the end of its maker’s life. 
The ideal component of the manmade object, its design and purpose remain, 
however, lodged in the axe. Whilst it lies in the ground, millennia pass, but the 
design and purpose lodged in the stone are impervious to damage and change. They 
persist, albeit inactive and known to no one. 
 
When an archaeologist discovers the stone and recognizes it as a tool, the 
maker’s memories of the axe’s purposeful design are instantly passed on and this 
recognition restores their existence during the entire period of neglect. The 
archaeologist digs the axe out of the ground and, recognizing it as a manmade tool, 
restores its full existence during the millennia of oblivion. Its persistence thorough 
time while it was lying buried in clay is retrospectively changed into a period of 
objective existence because it is recognized as such by the mind that shares the 
competence in axe manufacturing with the Neolithic man. 
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When the axe is first discovered, unearthed and cleaned and the scientist holds it 
in the same way as its Neolithic maker did, she understands its vital purpose in the 
same way as is was understood by the prehistoric man and communication between 
the two people is instantly established. The memories of the ancient ancestor gush 
towards the descendent who experiences a surge of a shared understating of 
something that the ancient man understood in the same way. The archaeologist 
touches the stone where her ancestor had touched it and feels the solidarity and 
connectedness via sharing the tactile and visual imagery with the ancient man.  She 
is instantly connected with his engineering thought and the millennia of silence 
matter no longer. The stone axe preserved its shape, and together with it kept the 
man’s memories safe. These memories were preserved and emerged as a message 
for us: the message that contains memories which can now live on. 
 
3. Evolution of memory 
 
Referring to the accumulation of memory prior to its broadcasting or sharing, it 
is impossible to pinpoint the moment when the memory of a particular event begins 
to accumulate in the individual’s mind. The process of perception and memory 
accumulation, like any other real processes, does not sprout out of nothing. The 
experience, acknowledgement and interpretation of an event will necessarily have its 
pre-history which, on the one hand, would involve the entire life of the person with 
all his or her previous memories, values and beliefs that affect his or her approach to 
the particular event and direct his or her selection of imagery that will be committed 
to memory. 
 
Moreover, the life of an individual with all its biological and psychological 
components is founded on the entire history of society, biological evolution, Earth’s 
development, and the evolution of the Universe itself, so the origins of a single 
recollection will have to be traced back to the beginning of the Universe. Infinite 
regress is inevitable here, and looking for clear boundaries of the process of memory 
transition (and of any other process) would be a thankless exercise. Rather than 
attempting to identify the process of memory transition by delineating its temporal 
boundaries, we could identify it by its nuclear element, the most meaningful and 
necessary phase towards which its history, prehistory and its future conceptually 
gravitate. In memory transition this could be the moment in which memories are 
accepted by the recipient.  
 
Memories that we accumulate change retrospectively under the influence of 
subsequent events and our personal growth as individuals. (Fell, 2010) The 
eventuality of passage of the memory to others, memory’s externalization and author 
independent existence will affect the memory’s history inside the author’s mind as 
well. Prior to the externalization it may be like an amorphous nebula of fleeting 
images, emotional responses to them, semi-thoughts and semi-feelings which, not 
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easily defined, are nevertheless deeply embedded in one’s life and manifest 
themselves in one’s actions, moods and judgments, and mix with other memories. 
When one wants to specify and externalize a particular memory in order to make it 
public, one must harvest these hazy and fleeting impressions, pull them together, 
ascribe to them some individualizing meaning and face them as an object with 
definite outlines. 
 
For Bergson, this concretisation of a memory would be an undesirable but 
necessary precondition for communicating this memory. The self with all its inner 
processes which would include those associated with memory accumulation and 
retention is the unbroken heterogeneous multiplicity of conscious states but for the 
purpose of communicating its content it needs to be modified and appear crystallised 
and discrete. (Bergson, 1910, p. 101) We conceptualise our memories, verbalise 
them and confine them to the boundaries of a narrative. Only in art we may be able 
to communicate our memories without deforming them by rationalisation. Artists 
externalise their memories whilst remaining faithful to their own fleeting emotions, 
semi-joys and semi-doubts, uncertain and conflicting feelings, all those irreducible 
inner events that constitute the nature of a person. 
 
When a memory enters the public domain it is detached from its author and the 
more widespread it is, the more likely it will become anonymous. A particular 
person or persons in the history of the mankind may have invented the wheel. Once 
this invention was appropriated by mankind the inventors’ names completely 
disappeared from its memory. The design and purpose of the wheel is now 
integrated in objects that every individual uses. The memory of its use and its 
purpose is so deeply engrained in our worldviews that we hardly acknowledge its 
existence: this knowledge belongs to the pool of memories of all mankind. 
 
4. Emission of memories and their distribution 
 
A single human being can remember something for many decades. Memories 
can survive as recollections of phenomena or as motor memories that manifest 
themselves as tendencies directing and shaping our behavior and our attitudes. This 
translates into the continued existence of memories acquired over many years by 
people belonging to different generations, a fact not duly acknowledged in society. 
If it were duly acknowledged, however, this would alter our understanding of what 
constitutes the present-day world. 
 
By the present-day, up-to-date reality we ordinarily mean those phenomena that 
relate to cutting-edge technology or the outlook on life that has been very recently 
formed.  Latest fashion, latest news, social problems that arise here and now – this is 
what, we ordinarily think, constitutes the present-day world. We also associate this 
ever renewed world with youth and progress unwittingly devaluing previous 
historical periods with their trends, news and problems treating them as outdated, 
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old-fashioned and irrelevant. We implicitly consider everything that came before 
now as a foundation for what is present assuming that present attitudes and things 
necessarily offer improvement as they build on the past. Like a lizard that sheds its 
tail, we constantly shed our past – or at least we are encouraged to do so. Being old-
fashioned or outdated is an accusation that we as socially active professionals and 
members of society want to avoid. 
 
Rawls warns against the temporal dominance of one particular generation. 
Cooperation and complimentarity are necessary for our civilisation, Rawls asserts 
(Rawls, 1972, p. 522 – 523), and human partnership that ensures societal prosperity 
and progress includes temporally displaced agents as well as contemporaries. 
Community is a dynamic formation and the temporal success of community is due 
to the cooperation of succeeding generations: ‘[T]he cooperation of many 
generations (or even societies) over a long period of time’ is necessary for ‘the 
realizations of the powers of human individuals living at any one time.’ (Rawls, 
1972, p. 523 – 525) As far as possible, justice between generations should mean 
‘equality’, and no generation should be treated more or less favourably. ‘The mere 
difference of location in time, of something being earlier or later, is not in itself a 
rational ground for having more or less regard for it.’ (Rawls, 1972, p. 293) 
 
For Rawls, the relationship of complementarily and cooperation between 
generations must be formed on the idea of justice in the same way as the relationship 
between contemporaries.* Whilst Rawls refers to the generations of people that are 
temporally removed form each other, his warning against temporal inequality is 
particularly relevant to the relationship between co-existing generations. 
 
In the current situation people are temporally accepted or discriminated against 
on the basis of their keeping up to date with those values and practices that are being 
set and promoted by the leading age group, i.e. those in a socially active and 
productive stage. The latter dictate what other people should do if they want to be 
included in a social medium. When older people refuse to adapt, they are left behind 
and excluded from the active participation in societal processes. They are treated as 
past that already does not exist. 
 
The world of today is made up of people of many ages, ranging form 0 to about 
100. The present state of the world for a human being does not equal the thin layer 
of immediacy amounting to today’s news and latest inventions. One’s entire 
assortment of memories that have been accumulated as vivid or faint recollections, 
values, beliefs and habits make up the cutting-edge existence of the person. And 
                                                            
* Justice, secured by just societal institutions, should be grounded in ‘the difference principle’, according 
to which wealth should be distributed in the way that all people would benefit form its accumulation.  It 
does not mean that everything should be shared equally between all parties. What it means is that all 
should benefit in some way as a result of distribution, and that if wealthy people get wealthier, poorer 
ones should become better off too. (Rawls, 1972, Chapter 13, “Democratic equality and the difference 
principle”, p. 75 – 83) 
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inasmuch as each person living now contributes to the content of the present time, 
the present time is diverse, deep and multi-temporal. For instance, for as long as war 
veterans are alive, the memories of the war will be the fact of the present. 
 
An ideal, utopian state of multi-temporal harmony would involve multi-
temporalism as a form of multiculturalism, where we do not ascribe ultimate value 
to one period of time devaluing others but allow all forms of technology and 
communication to coexist and facilitate their interactions. Value markers from 
temporal characteristics of events would be removed. Old and new would not be 
rivals but would acknowledge each other’s right to exist and each other’s validity. 
 
An ultimate example of a time friendly device that would incorporate technology 
from different eras and accommodate every living person’s technological memories 
would be a hi-fi which would use MP3, CDs, audio cassettes, reel-to-reel tapes, 
gramophone records and phonograph cylinders, as required by its users. 
 
5. Tangible and intangible memories 
 
Memory intended for sharing can be invested in a tangible object (book, badge) 
or it can be communicated intangibly at a performance or a lesson. Intangible 
memories largely concern habit memory and professional skills. The latter do not 
become author independent and require the continuation of practice for their 
realization and existence. Passed directly from person to person, the secrets of a 
trade and professional skills cannot be distributed by multiplication and are esoteric. 
They are transmitted in a live contact between the giver and the receiver, cannot be 
externalized, compressed or summarized. They are hard to disseminate. Rather than 
being engrained in an inanimate object, they are engrained in a living person as 
motor memories and attitudes. They are gained with difficulty and passed on with 
difficulty to each recipient who in his or her turn becomes a tangible carrier of those 
special memories that constitute specific professional knowledge, skills, and 
attitudes. The acquisition of a particular set of memories relating to a specific trade 
or profession exclude the acquisition of many alternative memories constituting the 
body of competence in other domains, which limits further the dissemination of 
particular memory sets. 
 
Whilst acquiring and appropriating those special professional memories, the 
person’ nature qualitatively changes. The transmission of intangible memories is a 
long and painstaking process. Training a teacher, doctor or a dancer takes years of 
human life. During these years masters and apprentices spend much of their time 
together and these long hours and days cannot be contracted into a time-saving 
format. The content of a teaching course could be stored on a memory stick that 
would fit inside one’s pocket but professional competence can only be achieved via 
extensive personal training. 
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Digital technology blurs the distinction between tangible and intangible 
memories to some extent. An instructor can make a video recording of the teaching 
session or create an interactive online program that his or her students can run as 
many times as they like. This has a potential to cut down the time that the instructor 
needs to spend interacting with students but it does not cut down the time that 
students themselves need to dedicate to absorbing the information and transforming 
it into the memories which will make them specialists in the field. In addition the 
online virtual interactive experience is an impoverished and streamlined extraction 
from the real experience. One may learn to respond to virtual situations, but this 
cannot sufficiently prepare the learner to real life situations.   
 
The accessibility of information via digital devices is a means of social inclusion 
and continuous democratization of knowledge dissemination. The democratization 
of education has been increasing anyway, making education available to a wider 
audience (e.g. UK University ranking table lists 99 universities in 2000 and 118 in 
2011), but access to courses in an online format takes education and training to a 
qualitatively new level and present new challenges. 
 
Education systems functioning now are a heritage of the established system of 
beliefs and practices according to which knowledge is acquired progressively in 
stages. A learner is expected to achieve competence in all lower stages of knowledge 
acquisition prior to progressing to a higher level. Progression to higher levels is 
safeguarded by tests and exams and an educator takes it for granted that students on 
the course are armed with the background knowledge and skills acquired at lower 
stages. Examinations are in place to ensure that only those competent in lower levels 
progress to higher levels. This practice of exclusion and intellectual elitism in 
education takes only selected few on board and leaves droves by the wayside. 
 
The current tendency of widening participation in education and knowledge 
acquisition boosted by digitalization, is a tendency of inclusion whereby people with 
varied background knowledge can access challenging material including higher 
education courses. In these situations educators are faced with audiences that may 
lack some skills and competences which are necessary for a smooth acquisition of 
taught material. 
 
This situation arises more and more often in a learning environment (at least in 
the British setting) and cannot be dismissed as an exception to the norm as it is 
rapidly becoming a norm in the UK. With the expansion of new universities and 
widely available online courses, lecturers can no longer afford to ignore this state of 
affairs treating it as an irritating nuisance that stands in the way of their professional 
performance. The lowering of standards needs to be acknowledged as something 
that warrants a due response and action, but what kind of response and action is 
actually ‘due’ in this case? 
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One can imagine a variety of approaches here but they would probably fall 
between the two extremes, let us call them (for the argument sake) a “Hegelian” and 
“Bergsonian” approaches respectively. The “Hegelian” approach dictates that reality 
should correspond to pre-existing concepts. The concept of higher education 
traditionally entails that those pursuing it and those providing it maintain the highest 
possible standards of literacy, general and specialist knowledge, as well as striving 
to supersede the existing achievements in the field. This approach upholds 
intellectual elitism and exclusion by means of formal examinations whereby the 
system promotes the communicative process of knowledge transmission and is 
merciless in relation to the communicative agents: if they can contribute to the 
excellence of the process they can stay on board, if they cannot, they must be 
excluded form the process. 
 
The “Bergsonian” approach puts reality forward, not concepts. Rather than 
violating real processes and making them fit into their corresponding concepts, a 
Bergsonian follower recognizes reality as it is, in all its uniqueness and evaluates the 
status of phenomena not on the basis of its correspondence to concepts but by virtue 
of it being what it is. What is imperfect for a Hegelian who measures what is by 
what should be, for a Bergsonist has the right to be exactly as it is even though there 
may be no concepts to reflect it. 
 
In the Hegelian approach educators’ practices and the reality in which they 
operate will generate a gap between what should be and what is, and the more 
knowledge distribution is democratized the greater this gap will become. Educators 
guided by the Hegelian approach can maintain the high standards of admission but 
they may not be able to fill their courses thus making themselves redundant. If they 
drop selection standards but maintain a high level of teaching they will find that 
their students are unable to engage fully in the communicative practice of the course.  
 
Educators guided by the Bergsonian approach will recognize that students’ 
background knowledge is uneven and that the current situation calls for a 
revolutionized approach to knowledge distribution. An academic who, for instance, 
is preparing a degree lecture will bear in mind that his or her audience may not be 
familiar with, say, important historical facts or Greek mythology, or they may lack 
competence in writing skills, i.e lack the background knowledge that the tertiary 
level Hegelian educator would insists on in an uncompromising manner. The 
Bergsonian educator will accept that he or she may be required to operate at 
different levels simultaneously. Whilst delivering a degree course the lecturer will 
be prepared to teach, as required, some elements of secondary and even primary 
education if these elements are necessary for understanding issues related to the 
lecture theme. He or she will also understand that teaching primary and secondary 
education elements in the lecture hall is not going to be the same as teaching these 
elements to primary or secondary school pupils.  In the lecture hall material will 
have to be explained quickly and effectively. Rather than providing a long term step-
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by-step theoretical support, the tertiary level educator must provide an elevator that 
would lift the learner upwards and take them straight to their required learning 
destination. * 
 
6. Externalized memory in the digital age 
 
There is an important difference between material substance flowing from one 
container to another and memories passing from mind to mind. When a physical 
substance (such as liquid) passes form one container to another, it fills one container 
while another becomes empty. Memories whilst being passed from one person to 
another do not abandon one mind to be transferred to another mind but become 
present in both minds. Spread via communicative transmissions, memory multiplies, 
and has the potential to enter the mind of every human being living now and in the 
future. 
 
Once memory is externalized and released into the public domain, it can multiply 
exponentially. If millennia ago only the mind of the maker and those close to him 
may have known of his axe, its design and purpose, once the tool has been 
discovered by today’s archeologist, information about it, i.e. the memory of it can be 
passed on to an infinite number of people via exhibitions, websites, lectures, 
photographs, journal articles etc. The Internet and media make it potentially possible 
to reproduce indefinitely the memories of the axe-head which can be embedded in 
the audio visual imagery populating computer monitors and TV screens, newspapers 
and journal pages. Potentially every living person and every person in the future can 
acquire the memory of the axe-head. However, although digital information 
technology seems to be boundless in its abilities to multiply and deliver information 
to human beings, the amount of information that a human being is able to receive 
and commit to memory is practically limited. Thus externalized and publicized, 
memories compete for attention, and the competition is vicious. 
 
Given the imbalance between the abundance of ever-increasing, self-multiplying 
information and the limitations of an individual mind to receive and process 
information, communication theorists begin to explore attention as a category of 
market economy where getting public attention is both the means of economic 
prosperity (e.g. via successful advertising) and a goal in itself (such as YouTube 
videos viewed thousands of times by Internet users) (Lanham, 2010; Bernardy, 
2010). 
 
It is also important to note another aspect that specifically concerns digital 
technology as a source of memory input, namely the over amplification of the visual 
component in memory transmission. Saito points out that we generally 
underestimate the power of everyday aesthetics which seriously influence our 
                                                            
* A thorough philosophical discussion exploring the relation of the subjective conditions of knowledge 
and higher education can be found in Crowther, 2003, p. 185-206. 
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actions and attitudes. (Saito, 2011) Saito refers to ‘unintended consequences of the 
cumulative and collective effects of our aesthetically-guided decisions’ (Saito, 2011, 
p.11), and in the current situation with the wide use of information technology 
where everyday aesthetics dominates, such effects could potentially be 
disproportionate in relation to real experiences when we may be guided differently 
whilst informed by all our senses in a balanced way. 
 
Transmitted digitally, audio-visual or predominantly visual memories of events 
are sterile, super clean, hypo-hygienic. Digital technology can give us an illusion 
that what we access is almost perfectly close to reality. Unwittingly we may begin to 
expect real things and events to be odorless and hypo hygienic, and if our real 
actions are guided by these attitudes then they may not be adequate for the real 
world that thrusts us into a far richer tactile and sensory environment than the virtual 
world can ever do. 
 
There are also situations when digital communication technology does not aid 
but hinder the process of memory transition. A digital photograph taken using 
powerful lenses produces images that strike the viewer with their precision and 
amplification of details. This precision and this amplification go beyond what a 
human eye can capture and on such a photograph we do not access something that 
the photographer saw or knowingly created, i.e. not his or her memories. The 
precision element has been generated by a machine and does not contain a human 
memory. As the image does not contain a human memory, it is conceptually void 
but viewers may nevertheless perceive it as someone’s memory and seek concepts 
that no one had invested in that image. Digital imagery that captures and amplifies 
what a human eye fails to see produces a parasitic aesthetic product that 
superimposes itself on the real memory, i.e. what the photographer actually saw and 
intended to preserve. 
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